Congestion games have extensively been studied till recently. It is shown by Fotakis (2010) that for every congestion game on an extension-parallel network, any best-response sequence reaches a pure Nash equilibrium of the game in n steps, where n is the number of players. We show that the fast convergence of best-response sequences results from M-convexity (of Murota (1996) ) of the potential function associated with the game. We also give a characterization of M-convex functions in terms of greedy algorithms.
Introduction
Congestion games (or finite potential games) have extensively been studied in the literature (e.g., [1, 8, 11, 12, 14] ). An interesting special class of congestion games on networks, which is called congestion games on extension-parallel networks, is considered by Holzman and Law-yone [12] (see also [6, 14, 19] ). Fotakis [8] showed a fast convergence behavior of the best-response dynamics for such games. That is, for every congestion game on an extension-parallel network, any best-response sequence converges to a pure Nash equilibrium of the game in n steps, where n is the number of the players. However, the underlying structure that brings the fast convergence has not yet fully been understood.
In the present paper we show that the fast convergence of best-response sequences results from M-convexity of the potential function associated with the game. M-convex functions were introduced by Murota [16, 17] based on Dress and Wenzel [4, 5] . The convex conjugate (or Legendre transform) of an Mconvex function is called an L-convex function [17] (also see [7] ). It has been recognized that L-/M-convex functions appear in various fields of operations research, economics, mathematics, and others (see, e.g., [2, 10, 18, 25] ). We now find yet another interesting instance of M-convexity structure in congestion games.
The present paper is organized as follows. We briefly review congestion games in Section 2 and M-convex functions in Section 3. In Section 4 we examine the best-response dynamics for congestion games on extension-parallel networks and show that the essence of the fast convergence of the bestresponse dynamics is due to the M-convexity structure of the games. It is revealed in Section 5 that the best-response dynamics corresponds to a greedy algorithm for minimizing M-convex functions, which is a natural generalization of the greedy algorithm due to Dress and Wenzel [4] for valuated matroids. We also show a characterization of M-convex functions in terms of greedy algorithms.
Congestion Games
A congestion game [20] is a tuple Γ = (N, A, (
(a) N is a finite nonempty set of players, (b) A is a set of resources, (c) for each i ∈ N, P (i) is a set of subsets of A, i.e.,
Each player i ∈ N selects a set P i ∈ P (i) , which forms a strategy configuration P = (P i | i ∈ N). The congestion induced by P at resource a ∈ A is ν P (a) = |{i ∈ N | a ∈ P i }|.
(
Then, the incurred individual cost of player i is given by the sum of congestion costs over the resources that player i uses, i.e.,
For any player i ∈ N and strategy Q ∈ P (i) let (P −i , Q) be the strategy configuration obtained from P by replacing P i by Q.
A potential function associated with a strategy configuration P = (P i | i ∈ N) of the congestion game Γ is introduced by Rosenthal [20] as follows:
whereĉ a (·) represents a function of accumulated congestion costs given bŷ
We then have the following fundamental relation
for any strategy configuration P, i ∈ N, and Q ∈ P (i) . (A game having this property is called a potential game.) Hence local minima of potential Φ are exactly pure Nash equilibria of congestion game Γ, as shown by Rosenthal [20] . It is shown ( [15] ) that the class of congestion games coincides with the class of finite potential games.
M-convex Functions
The concept of M-convex function was introduced by Murota ( [16, 17] ). We briefly review some fundamental properties of M-convex functions.
Let W be a finite nonempty set and f be a function f :
We call f convex-extensible if the lower envelope of the convex hull of epi( f ) gives a convex functionf :
its effective domain is nonempty and it satisfies the exchange axiom:
where χ u for u ∈ W is a unit vector in Z W such that χ u (u) = 1 and χ u (v) = 0 for v u, and we allow +∞ ≥ +∞.
The following is a well-known characterization of M-convex functions (see [16, 17] and also [9, 23] ). Figure 17 .4]).
convex-extensible function with a nonempty bounded effective domain. Letf be the convex extension of f . Then f is an M-convex function if and only if for every non-vertical edge L of the epigraph epi(f ) the direction vector of the line segment obtained by the projection
An M-convex function f is a special case of M ♮ -convex function whose effective domain lies on a hyperplane x(W) (≡ ∑ v∈W x(v)) = k for some integer k. We call the integer k the rank of f .
Congestion Games on Extension-parallel Networks
Suppose that we are given a directed graph G = (V, A) with a vertex set V, an arc set A, and specified (distinct) source s and sink t in V. Arc set A is regarded as a set of resources. Consider a congestion game Γ = (N, A, (
is a set of elementary directed paths from source s to sink t (st-paths) in graph G = (V, A) and every st-path is regarded as a set of the arcs (resources) lying on the path.
An interesting special class of congestion games on networks is the class of congestion games on extension-parallel networks ( [12] ). An extension-parallel network with a source and a sink is constructed by finitely many repeated operations of source/sink extension and parallel join defined below (see Figure 2), starting from finitely many networks, each consisting of a single arc whose tail and head are, respectively, a source and a sink.
(1) (source extension): Given a network G, construct a new network G ′ by adding a new arc a to a source of G in such a way that the head of a is the source of G and the tail of a is the source of the new G ′ .
(2) (sink extension): Given G, construct a new network G ′ by adding a new arc a to a sink of G in such a way that the tail of a is the sink of G and the head of a is the sink of the new G ′ .
(3) (parallel join): Given two distinct networks G 1 and G 2 , construct a new network G ′ by identifying their respective sources as a source of the new G ′ and by identifying their respective sinks as a sink of the new G ′ . In the sequel we consider a symmetric game Γ such that every player's strategy set P (i) is the set P all of all paths from source s to sink t in an extension-parallel network G.
Theorem 2 (Fotakis [8]). For any symmetric congestion game
) on an extensionparallel network, any sequence of strategies generated by the procedure, Procedure(Best Response), given below reaches a pure Nash equilibrium in n(= |N|) steps.
LetP ∈ P all be a minimizer of Φ((P −i , P)) in P ∈ P all . Put P ← (P −i ,P). 3. Return P.
It should be noted that minimizers of Φ((P −i , P)) in P ∈ P all are exactly minimizers of the individual cost π i (P −i , Q) in P ∈ P all , due to (5). Hence each choice of a minimizerP ∈ P all for i ∈ N in Step 2 is called a best response of player i.
More precisely, Fotakis [8] shows that, for extension-parallel networks, whenever the strategy of a player i ∈ N is its best response with respect to the current state, then even after some other player changes its strategy to a best response strategy, the strategy of player i will remain a best response strategy. One way to rephrase Fotakis' result, is by stating that Procedure(Best Response) always leads to a pure Nash equilibrium, no matter what permutation is chosen in the first step.
We will now show how the correctness of the procedure, Procedure(Best Response), can be derived from results on Mconvexity, thus implying Fotakis' result.
Each strategy configuration P = (P i | i ∈ N) is made to correspond to a vector x P ∈ Z P all given by
where χ P i is a unit vector in Z P all such that χ P i (P) = 1 if P = P i and = 0 otherwise. (Note that P is not uniquely determined by x P in general.)
For each arc a ∈ A denote by Q a the set of paths P ∈ P all containing arc a. Then we have the following 
(Proof) Suppose that during the construction of the extensionparallel graph G = (V, A) arc a belongs to a graph G 1 and arc a ′ to another graph G 2 and the operation of parallel join is made for G 1 and G 2 , then there is no st-path that contains both a and a ′ . Hence Q a ∩ Q a ′ = ∅. On the other hand, if arc a belongs to a graph G 1 and arc a ′ is used for a source/sink-extension of G 1 , then we have Q a ⊆ Q a ′ . □ Remark 1. The laminarity structure has been recognized as a rooted tree structure ( [11, 13] ) such that the set of non-root vertices of the rooted tree is the resource set (arc set) A of G and the set of non-root vertices of every path in the tree from the root to a leaf is the arc set of a respective path in G from the source to the sink. The tree structure described in [11, 13] is closely related to the Tutte decomposition tree of a 2-connected graph into 3-connected components, cycles, and graphs of parallel arcs (see [26] ), where only the latter two kinds of components appear (even for series-parallel graphs). Here, for a given extension-parallel (or, more generally, series-parallel) graph G with source s and sink t, we should define a graph G ′ obtained by adding to G a reference arc from s to t and consider the Tutte decomposition tree of G ′ .
For a given strategy configuration P = (P i | i ∈ N), using the vector x P ∈ Z P all in (8), the potential function value Φ(P) in (3) is equal to
regarded as a function, denoted byΦ(·), in x P , where x P (Q a ) = ∑ P∈Q a x P (P) for each a ∈ A. Note thatΦ(x P ) is the sum over all a ∈ A of scalar, discrete convex functionsĉ a (·) on integers, and the sets Q a (∀a ∈ A) form a laminar family. It follows that the functionΦ(x) in x ∈ Z P all is what is called a laminar convex function with its effective domain ∆ n = {x ∈ Z P all ≥0 | x(P all ) = n}, where n = |N|. This implies the following (see [3, 17] ).
Lemma 4. The functionΦ(x) with its effective domain ∆ n is an M-convex function.
As will be discussed in the next section, the M-convexity ofΦ implies the validity of Theorem 2, the n step convergence of the best-response sequence, due to Fotakis [8] . Procedure(Best Response) can be regarded as a specialized version of a greedy algorithm for M-convex functions.
A Greedy Algorithm for M-Convex Functions
We give a greedy algorithm for M-convex functions, which is a natural generalization of the greedy algorithm given by Dress and Wenzel [4] for valuated matroids. The greedy algorithm given in this section is slightly different from the existing algorithms given by Shioura [21, 22] and Tamura [24] (also see [17] ). We show the validity of our greedy algorithm by adapting Dress and Wenzel's proof in [4] for valuated matroids.
For a finite nonempty set W let us consider an M-convex function f : Z W → R ∪ {+∞} having a nonempty bounded effective domain dom( f ) = {x ∈ Z W | f (x) < +∞}. Suppose that the effective domain is included in the nonnegative orthant, i.e., dom( f ) ⊂ Z W ≥0 and that x(W) (= ∑ v∈W x(v)) = n ≥ 1 for all x ∈ dom( f ), where we recall that n is equal to the rank of f . Also define N = {1, 2, · · · , n}. It should be noted that W corresponds to the set P all of all st-paths and σ(i) appearing in the algorithm given below corresponds to player i's initial strategy P i ∈ P all .
Greedy Algorithm
Find an element w (Proof) Let x i be the x obtained after the ith execution of Step 2 for i = 1, 2, · · · , n. Also denote by w * i the element w * ∈ W found at the ith execution of Step 2. It suffices to prove the following local optimality (see [17] ):
We show that for any M-convex function f : Z W → R∪{+∞} of rank n ≥ 1, the greedy algorithm obtains x = x n satisfying (10), by induction on the rank n of f , where recall that the effective domain of f lies on the hyperplane x(W) = n. Note that we fix W in the following arguments.
For any M-convex function of rank n = 1, (10) holds. Hence, let k be an integer with k ≥ 1 and suppose that for any M-convex function of rank n = k the greedy algorithm obtains x = x n satisfying (10), i.e., the greedy algorithm finds a minimizer of any M-convex function f when x(W) = k for all x ∈ dom( f ). Now suppose n = k + 1. Since f remains to be M-convex by the restriction of its effective domain B = dom( f ) to B 1 = B ∩ {x ∈ Z W | x(σ(n)) ≥ 1}, it follows from the induction hypothesis that x n−1 is a minimizer of f restricted on B 1 .
Let y ∈ dom( f ) be a minimizer of f . Notice that if y ∈ B 1 then x n is indeed a minimizer of f since f (
where the equality follows from (11) . Thus, suppose y(σ(n)) = 0. Then x n−1 (σ(n)) > y(σ(n)). By the exchange axiom of Mconvex functions there exists j ∈ N \ {σ(n)} such that y( j) > x n−1 ( j) and
Since y + χ σ(n) − χ j ∈ B 1 , it follows from (11) that
Also, since x n−1 − χ σ(n) + χ j is a candidate for x n , we get
It follows from (12)- (14) that f (y) ≥ f (x n ), i.e., x n is a minimizer of f . □ Remark 3. Consider N as the set of players and identify W with the set P all of all st-paths in an extension-parallel network G, and f withΦ in (9) . Then the greedy algorithm for f becomes Procedure(Best Response). It may also be worth mentioning that the number n of steps is independent of the size of W.
Remark 4. It follows from results in [22, 24] that as an algorithm for minimizing an M-convex function f we can skip those is which satisfy σ(i) ∈ {w * ℓ | ℓ = 1, · · · , i − 1}, which is also implicitly implied by the above proof of Theorem 5. This corresponds to the rule: keep the present strategy P i if it is a best one even if there exist multiple (other) best strategies. It is a natural restriction of the behavior of the players in the case of congestion games.
Similarly as in [4] for valuated matroids, we have a converse of Theorem 5 and hence show the equivalence between the greediness and M-convexity as follows.
where (Proof) Since adding a linear function keeps M-convexity, Theorem 5 implies the only-if part, and hence we show the if part.
Since f is convex-extensible, denoting byf the convex extension of f , it suffices to prove that every non-vertical edge vector of the epigraph off projected on R W belongs to {χ u −χ v | u, v ∈ W, u v}, due to Proposition 1.
Let L be an arbitrary non-vertical edge of the epigraph off and letL be the projection of L on R W . Also let x 1 , x 2 ∈ B be the end points ofL. Let z ∈ B be the point in (L \ {x 1 }) ∩ B nearest to x 1 . Then there exists a vector d ∈ R W such that x 1 is the unique minimizer of f d and {x
Hence, starting from z, the Greedy Algorithm for f d must move to x 1 by the first improving step. By the definition of the Greedy Algorithm, the direction of the movement from z to x 1 , which is a direction vector ofL, belongs to {χ u − χ v | u, v ∈ W, u v}. □
The proof of the if part of Theorem 6 can easily be adapted to that of the following fundamental fact on generic greedy algorithms. We call a transformation from x ∈ Z W to x − χ u + χ v for u, v ∈ W a basic local transformation. 
Then, f is an M-convex function.
It follows from the present theorem that the validity of algorithms based on repeated basic local transformations such as those given by [21, 22, 24] implies M-convexity of the objective functions.
Concluding Remarks
We have revealed the M-convexity structure of congestion games on extension-parallel networks, which explains the fast convergence of the best-response dynamics shown by Fotakis [8] . We believe that there are phenomena in congestion games in general that can be viewed from M-convexity or other variants of discrete convexity (cf. [1, 27] ). Finding and investigating such instances are left for future research.
